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1 INTRODUCTION 
Through the centuries control over the seas has played a 
prominent role in the strategic thinking of great powers. The 
seas have offered an easy route for the projection of military 
power to distant areas. And now, with the development of 
submarines, they have acquired a further military dimension in 
the form of submerged weaponry that is not easily detected 
even with the most modern technology. Thus today, the nuclear 
missile submarines are thought to be the least vulnerable leg of 
the strategic Triad and hence the best assurance of second-strike 
retaliatory capability. 
It is difficult to survey the naval power of the superpowers 
regionally because of the world-wide mobility of vessels. The 
autonomy of navies and the traditional freedom of the high seas 
have apparently seen to it that naval forces are exempted from 
consideration in arms control negotiations. Thus only five 
multilateral agreements touch on nuclear weapons at sea, among 
them the 1971 Seabed Treaty which prohibits the emplacing of 
nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor. The 
negotiations on reduction of conventional forces in Europe, 
which started in Vienna in March 1989, do not include naval or 
specifically nuclear forces. 
The northern seas were drawn into the maritime arms race 
in the 1960s when the Soviet Union began an intensive 
development of her naval power and of the Northern Fleet 
bases in the Kola Peninsula. NATO's immediate response was 
to develop a surveillance and intelligence network aimed at 
detecting the enemy forces and, if necessary, aiding land and air 
forces attempting to block the Soviet forces from entering the 
North Atlantic. 
Pursuant to the SALT I agreement in 1972, the superpowers 
stepped up the deployment of their nuclear arsenal in 
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submarines. At the same time the Soviet Navy evolved to a 
blue-water navy and the Soviet Northern Fleet to the largest of 
the country's four fleets. The US response was to develop a new 
maritime strategy emphasizing the forward deployment of naval 
forces, and to start planning for a 600-ship navy. The number of 
sea-based nuclear weapons has increased constantly. Today some 
15,000 nuclear weapons, between 25 % and 35 % of the world's 
total, are possessed by the navies of the nuclear powers.' In the 
wake of the INF Treaty this percentage is likely to grow, as sea-
launched cruise missiles can target sites previously covered by 
the banned intermediate-range missiles. 
Comprehensive disclosure of the new US maritime strategy 
in 1986 reopened discussion on the strategic significance of the 
Arctic regions and the northernmost part of the European 
continent. Similarly, improved weapons technologies, which 
resulted in increased operational mobility of ground forces, a 
longer range for tactical aircraft, new designs for strategic and 
tactical submarines and the development of long-range cruise 
missiles and other precision guided munitions, have changed 
the military-political relevance of the High North. 
The Arctic has assumed a new importance in the strategic 
thinking of the superpowers, not only because of geopolitical 
developments and advances in technology but because of the 
course naval doctrines have taken in both the United States and 
the Soviet Union. These put considerable emphasis on 
engagements in the Barents and Norwegian seas and even under 
the permanent ice of the Arctic Ocean. 
The shortest trajectory for strategic air assets between the 
Soviet Union and the United States crosses over the Arctic. 
Neither strategic thinking nor new weapons technologies have 
changed this reality during the last two decades. The significance 
of the Arctic airspace will persist, especially if both powers 
continue to develop the penetration ability of their strategic 
bomber forces. 
This article looks at contemporary military-political 
developments in the High North: the Soviet military build-up 
and the US maritime strategy developed to counter that threat. 
It then surveys the implications of the new situation for the 
security of Canada and the five Nordic countries and the security 
policies evolved in response. 
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2 THE GEOPOLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENT OF THE HIGH 
NORTH 
The High North in this article refers to northern Europe and the 
Norwegian and Barents seas. Necessarily the analysis also 
includes the Arctic Ocean and the adjacent littorals. 
The Gulf Stream keeps the waters west of Svalbard open all 
year, and the Barents Sea south of Bear Island free of pack ice 
almost to the eastern end of the Kola Peninsula. The "passage" 
between the demilitarized Svalbard archipelago and the northern 
shoreline of Norway is about 750 kilometers. 
Western Alaska and eastern Siberia are only 90 kilometres 
apart at the Bering Strait, which is essentially enclosed by 
American and Soviet territories. The depth of the strait is about 
40 metres. 
The northern circumpolar seas on the Eurasian side, i.e., 
the Barents, Kara, Laptev and East Siberian seas, are shallow 
seas above the continental shelf. On the North American side 
the continent descends rather abruptly into the deep basins. The 
Norwegian Sea is deep, in central parts more than 2000 metres. 
From Greenland, an underwater ridge extends via Iceland and 
the Faroe Islands to Scotland. 
The Arctic Ocean is likewise very deep, with basins between 
3000 and 5000 metres. The thickness of the floating raft of ice 
ranges from a few inches to nearly 200 feet. The continual tearing, 
grinding and compression of the raft creates areas of newly 
formed ice, thin enough to allow submarines to break surface 
for the purpose of communicating or firing missiles.2 
Most of the region has an arctic climate and much of the 
terrain is rugged, inhospitable, and sparsely populated with 
few lines of communication. In World War II in the summer of 
1941, two German Mountain SS-divisions attacked from Norway 
towards Murmansk and were able to advance only 24 kilometres 
in two and a half months. 
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Figure 1 The High North as part of the Arctic. 
The weather conditions in autumn and winter severely 
restrict the use of tactical air assets. The long daylight hours in 
summer, on the other hand, allow the air force a decisive role in 
land warfare on treeless terrain. 
The Svalbard archipelago is under Norwegian sovereignty, 
but mining, oil and gas exploration and other industrial activities 
are governed by the 40 signatory nations of the 1920 Svalbard 
Treaty. Norway and the Soviet Union are the only states to have 
established a major permanent commercial presence on 
Spitsbergen, Svalbard's main island. Greenland, part of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, owes its strategic importance to its 
location on the shortest route between North America and the 
Soviet Union. 
The various installations in Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes 
and Norway permit NATO to carry out extensive and continuous 
surveillance of the Norwegian and Barents Seas. In time of 
military conflict this geopolitical setting would make the thrust 
of the Soviet Northern Fleet into the Atlantic difficult. The 
introduction of satellite surveillance and the airborne warning 
and control system (AWACS) both in NATO and in the Warsaw 
Pact, contributes to a better intelligence picture for both alliances. 
Scarce mineral resources have been discovered in the 
northern waters and on the continental shelves, and as the 
technology to exploit them emerges, so does the potential for 
conflict. Likewise fish stocks are eagerly sought after. In response, 
the coastal states have established economic zones of 200 nautical 
miles, which are regulated by rules of international law as 
implemented by the national laws of the states. Conflicts over 
resources are by nature, of course, likely to involve allies as 
much as militarily opposed nations.3  
The waters of the North Atlantic are important fishing 
grounds especially for Norway, the Soviet Union and Iceland. 
Oil exploration has begun in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, 
and although the size of oil and gas reserves in the area is not 
yet known, significant gas discoveries have already been made. 
These resources add to the strategic significance of the area. The 
issue of dividing the continental shelf in the Barents Sea between 
Norway and the Soviet Union remains unsettled. 
The economic importance of the Arctic to the United States, 
Canada and the Soviet Union is also increasing. The Prudhoe 
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Bay and Beaufort Sea oil fields and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
System, the Urengoi natural gas field and the Siberian gas 
pipeline, for example, will have an important role in the future 
energy equation. 
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3 THE SOVIET KOLA PENINSULA 
AND ITS STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 
The bases of the Soviet Northern Fleet lie at the edge of the 
Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. The harbours of Murmansk are ice-
free all year round and allow direct access to the North Atlantic. 
According to Michael MccGwire, the two main maritime 
missions of the Soviet Navy are to contribute to the Soviet long-
range nuclear strike capability and to counter the Western sea-
based nuclear strike systems. The Soviet SSBN force of nuclear 
powered ballistic missile submarines has three overlapping roles: 
intercontinental strike, continental strike, and national strategic 
reserve.4 
The deployment of the SS-N-8 in 1972 made the polar 
regions increasingly important to the Soviet nuclear strike 
capability. Advances in submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) technology allowed the Soviet Union to pull back her 
SSBNs from forward deployment to the Arctic Sea areas, over 
which the Soviet conventional forces had far better control. 
Meanwhile during the 1970s the US Navy was developing 
new classes of submarines specifically designed to operate 
against Soviet SSBNs; and more antisubmarine systems mounted 
in surface ships, submarines, and aircraft became available at 
the same time. The Soviet response was to develop anti-
submarine defences in the Northern Fleet area and in the Sea of 
Okhotsk, which would turn them into ocean "bastions" where 
SSBNs could be deployed in safety. Because anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) units are highly vulnerable to superior forces, it 
was also necessary to establish command of both these areas. 
The outer defence zone assumed new importance as well: in the 
Norwegian Sea the Soviets had earlier been primarily concerned 
with denying command of the sea to the West. Now they became 
concerned with securing command for themselves as a means 
of strengthening the outer defences of the SSBN bastions.' 
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Observed manoeuvre patterns, shipbuilding programmes 
and internal Soviet debates have led Western analysts to conclude 
that the Northern Fleet now has three major wartime objectives 
in the High North: 
* interdiction of the Atlantic sea-lines of communication 
between the US and Western Europe, 
* protection of the Soviet SSBN force (the sea-based 
"nuclear reserve" or second strike capability), and 
* defence of the northern approaches to the Soviet Union, 
including the support of land campaigns. 
There are differences in opinion as to which of the first two 
objectives, the more offensive or the more defensive strategy, is 
the priority of the Soviet Navy. Some see them as complementary: 
by moving into the North Atlantic the Northern Fleet would 
attempt to tie down Western naval forces and thus prevent 
them from attacking the Soviet SSBNs. There seems to be 
widespread agreement that the principal mission of the Northern 
Fleet's other assets, its tactical submarines and surface forces, is 
to protect the SSBNs.6 
By the end of the 1970s the Soviets had apparently decided 
to downgrade the relative importance of the Arctic Ocean as an 
area for the deployment of SSBNs and to give priority to the Sea 
of Okhotsk, which would be secured by improving the military 
and physical defences of the Kurile Islands and reinforcing the 
Pacific Fleet.' Similarly, it seems that, since the mid-eighties, the 
emphasis in the Soviet effort to acquire a sea-based strategic 
reserve has been shifting from the SSBNs to their defence, within 
this defence from submarines to surface combatants, and as a 
whole from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet.8 The Northern 
Fleet nevertheless has the newest submarines — 6 Typhoon and 
6 Delta IV SSBNs — and neither of these is present in the Pacific 
Fleet. The Northern Fleet continues, then, as the most important 
component of the sea-based strategic reserve, while the Pacific 
Fleet is a complementary 'leg' of the retaliatory capability. 
The Soviet SSBN forces are now believed to number 61 
vessels of which almost two thirds are deployed in the Northern 
Fleet. 
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Table 1 
Deployment of Soviet Ballistic Missile Nuclear 
Submarines (SSBNs) and 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)9" 
No. of SSBN 	 Re-entry 	 Launcher total 
Northern 	Pacific 	 vehicles/ June 1990 
SSBN 	Fleet (NF) 	Fleet (PF) SLBMs 	SLBM 	 NF 	PF 
Typhoon 6 - 20 SS-n-20 6 å 0.1 MT 120 - 
Delta IV 6 - 16 SS-N-23 10 å 0.1 MT 96 - 
Delta III 5 9 16 SS-N-18 1-5 å 0.02-0.45 MT 80 144 
Delta II 4 - 16 SS-N-8 1-2 a 0.8 MT 64 - 
Delta I 9 9 12 SS-N-8 1-2 a 0.8 MT 108 108 
Yankee II 1 - 12 SS-N-17 1 å 0.5 MT 12 - 
Yankee I 6 6 16 SS-N-6 1-2 å 1-0.5 MT 96 96 
Total 37 24 576 348 
% of total 61 % 39 % 62 % 38 % 
W 	* (The figures are based on The Military Balance 1990-1991. Other sources give slightly different figures.) 
Operational strength of the Soviet non-strategic (tactical) 
subsurface fleet is believed to include 46 nuclear-powered guided 
missile submarines (SSGN), of which 27 (59%) are in the Northern 
Fleet; 68 nuclear-powered submarines (SSN), of which 42 (62%) 
are in the Northern Fleet; and 128 other tactical submarines 
(SSG and SS), of which 37 (29%) are in the Northern Fleet.1° 
The SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is capable 
of being launched from Akula, Sierra, Victor III and converted 
Yankee Notch-class attack submarines, and it is believed to be 
operational in all but the Victor 111." The experimental Mike-
class with SS-N-21 was lost in the Norwegian Sea on 7 April 
1989. When deployed aboard an SSN, the SS-N-21 is fired from 
a 53 - cm torpedo tube. When carrying a single nuclear warhead, 
the missile is estimated to have a range of 3000 km. A further 
SLCM, the SS-NX-24, is under evaluation aboard a converted 
Yankee-class SSBN.12 
Major surface combatants in the Northern Fleet number 60 
vessels, including two carriers (40% of a total of 5), 16 cruisers 
(37% of 43), 8 destroyers (26% of 31) and 34 frigates (24% of 
141).13 
In support of the Northern Fleet there are approximately 
400 aircraft based in 20 airfields in the Kola Peninsula. Included 
are the modern missile-carrying TU-26s (Backfire). Like the TU-
16s (Badger), if they are refuelled the TU-26s have a range 
extending from the Kola to areas south of the Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The naval air force units of the 
Northern Fleet with stand-off missiles constitute a potent threat 
against NATO naval forces. 
The Kola Peninsula is also an important early-warning and 
defence area against air attacks. The air defence forces of the 
Archangelsk Air Defence Sector include some 350 all-weather 
fighters, of which 100 are stationed on the Kola Peninsula. No 
strategic bombers or fighter-bombers are permanently deployed 
in the Kola area. 
The two motorized rifle divisions and the naval infantry 
brigade on the Kola Peninsula appear to be basically defensive 
considering the size of the area and the importance of the naval 
bases to the Soviet Union. The Northern Fleet also has Spetsnaz 
units assigned to it. 
The Soviet Union's main objective today seems to be for the 
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forces in Kola to secure a Soviet second-strike capability. 
Logically, their use on a large scale for other purposes would be 
self-defeating. 
Thus a paradox has been created: the strategic importance 
of the Kola base resources might serve to deter their use on the 
tactical level. The Soviet Union would hesitate to put vital 
strategic interests at risk for the attainment of limited local gains. 
However, it cannot be excluded that the Soviet Union has made 
calculations for gaining a foothold in Norway as a means of 
providing even greater security for Soviet arms based in 
Murmansk.14 
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4 THE ISSUE OF US MARITIME 
STRATEGY 
The gist of a new maritime strategy15 was adopted by the US 
Navy between 1981 and 1986. As a global strategy it has several 
purposes, but only its implications for the Nordic regions will 
be dealt with here. 
The mission of the US maritime strategy seems first to 
maintain deterrence and crisis control and secondly to function 
as an efficient war fighting strategy if the deterrence fails. 
Functionally a war is foreseen as unfolding in three phases. In 
the first phase, Deterrence or the Transition to War, forward 
deployment of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces (particularly 
attack submarines) will force the Soviet submarines to retreat 
into defensive bastions. Power would be projected into the 
Norwegian Sea by moving aircraft carrier battle groups to protect 
Norway and to prevent the Soviet Northern Fleet from moving 
south of its home waters in the Barents Sea. The decision to 
move the Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB, renamed Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade) to Norway might be taken early during 
a major international crisis. 
Should deterrence fail, a second phase, Seizing the Initiative, 
would be implemented. Carrier battle groups would move into 
the upper reaches of the Norwegian Sea and launch air strikes 
and cruise missile strikes against the Soviet naval and air forces 
and their ports and airfields on the Kola Peninsula. The ASW 
forces would wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet 
submarines, including SSBNs. An essential aspect of this phase 
is to establish a logistic structure to support sustained forward 
operations. The greatest threat to the US fleet during this phase 
would be the missile-carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. 
These would be destroyed as far from the carrier battle groups 
as possible, and also their bases. 
The final phase, Carrying the Fight to the Enemy, would 
begin once sea control had been established. The aggressive 
campaign against Soviet submarines, and attacks on the bases 
and support structure of the Soviet Navy would continue. Marine 
amphibious forces would be used directly against targets ashore. 
The overall objective would be to restore peace on terms 
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favourable to the US and her allies. 
The strategy is seen by its advocates as a maritime 
component of national strategy that can contribute to deterrence, 
promote allied solidarity, ensure unimpeded reinforcement of 
Europe, divert Soviet resources and attention from the Central 
Front, and provide unique war termination leverage.16 
One of the focal and most debated aspects of US maritime 
strategy is the intention to alter the strategic balance by hunting 
out and destroying the Soviet SSBNs. It is not entirely clear, 
however, that the balance of forces would work to NATO's 
advantage. 
The Soviets have 37 SSBNs and 106 attack and cruise missile 
submarines in the Northern Fleet." The US Navy now maintains 
48 of its 91 tactical submarines in the Atlantic.1 ' Moreover, the 
American submarines based in Bangor, Washington, and the 
Soviet submarines based in Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka, are fully 
capable of passing back and forth to the Arctic waters except 
during winter months when the shallowness of water beneath 
the ice could make it hazardous. In wartime, it would be 
relatively easy to close the Bering Strait to all users by minefields. 
The technical feasibility of conducting hunt and kill 
operations against submerged submarines has not been widely 
discussed in public sources. The experiences of the Swedes and 
Norwegians in their home waters indicate that the task is not an 
easy one. In crisis, moreover, the Soviets would encourage many 
of the SSBNs to hide under the polar ice cap,19 which would 
effectively rule out the superior Western air and surface ASW 
assets.20 In the Arctic, within the limits posed by extremely quiet 
submarines, and without other than acoustical techniques for 
areal searches, strategic antisubmarine warfare becomes 
extremely difficult.21  
The Soviet Union would hardly take calmly to the 
destruction of her second-strike capability and would 
presumably launch a retaliatory attack. The Soviet Strategic Air 
Force is modest and the increasing accuracy of the US inter-
continental ballistic missiles (MX) and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (D-5) increases their counter-force capability. 
In sophisticated estimates of the effects of massive retaliatory 
attacks, the calculations are done in terms of equivalent megatons 
(EMT). Calculations suggest22 that a retaliatory force able to 
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deliver 200 EMT would be minimally sufficient for destroying 
one-half of US industrial capacity and 150 EMT would destroy 
about one-fourth of the US population (assured destruction 
capability). Beyond 400 EMT, nuclear attack would produce 
little additional damage. Thus, for the Soviets to preserve a 
capability of 400 EMT would require the survival of a minimum 
of 10 of their 
Delta I1I-type SSBNs.23 There is, of course, no way to 
predetermine the number of SSBNs the Soviets could afford to 
lose. Now, if the fear of losing first-strike nuclear weapons might 
attract the use of nuclear weapons, it is even more reasonable to 
think that a counter-force attack against the Soviets' strategic 
retaliatory nuclear forces - although conducted with 
conventional weapons - might lead to their use. 
Given the widespread nuclearization of both navies, one 
cannot simply remove the nuclear equation from strategy and 
hope that any war will remain conventional. On the contrary, 
the new US strategy could increase the probability that a 
superpower naval war, or any war that involves US and Soviet 
naval forces, will lead to the use of nuclear weapons before 
escalating to a truly global - and nuclear - war.24 The majority 
of the superpowers' surface combatants carry nuclear weapons. 
And the armament of the Soviet Naval Air is largely based on 
nuclear weapons. The scarcely populated areas of Northern 
Europe, Canada, Greenland and the Arctic are particularly 
attractive for the demonstrative use of a nuclear weapon. It is 
well known that the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by 
even a single high-altitude explosion is capable of disrupting all 
command, control, communications and intelligence assets in 
the area. 
According to declared strategy, the US would consider early 
maritime pre-positioning of forces to the far north in time of 
potential conflict. Operating aircraft carriers in the Norwegian 
Sea to defend Norway or to threaten Soviet military installations 
on the Kola Peninsula is nevertheless viewed by critics as risking 
escalation.25 In any case, from the east coast of the United States 
it takes at least a week of sailing to reach the Norwegian Sea. 
The US Second Fleet Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia 
covers the Atlantic both north and south. It has 7 aircraft carriers 
(CV/CVN), 2 battleships (BB), 21 SAM cruisers (CG/CGN), 32 
destroyers (DDG and DD), and 54 frigates (FFC and FF), 
compared with 2 carriers, 16 cruisers, 8 destroyers and 34 frigates 
of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The Second Fleet typically deploys 
6-7 Carrier Battle Groups, 1-2 Battleship Surface Attack Groups, 
1 Amphibious Group and 4 Underway Replenishment Groups.26 
The balance of forces is even more advantageous to the West 
when the national NATO and Warsaw Pact navies in the Atlantic 
are included in the calculation. 
Forcing a roll-back of advancing Soviet naval forces would 
not be an easy mission. The Soviets would have a large number 
of bombers, cruise missiles and other strike systems - even 
ICBMs - which could be used against the carriers. The land-
based C3I networks that support the allied fleets would be 
especially vulnerable. The Soviets would also employ fighter 
aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery to defend 
the Kola bases. Forcing a roll-back would require the destruction 
of Soviet submarines and Soviet naval air capability in the area 
before the carrier groups moved in. 
On one carrier there are generally 90 aircraft and about 34 
of them are designated attack aircraft. Thus the number of aircraft 
that US carriers could muster for an air offensive is limited and 
they would have to be augmented with significant numbers of 
land-based fighters and bombers.27 
The new long-range cruise missiles would no doubt play 
an important role in the kind of warfare that is envisaged. An 
increasing number of ships are now armed with launchers for 
SLCM, either nuclear or conventional land-attack missiles or 
conventional anti-surface ship warfare (ASUW) cruise missiles. 
Launchers for the nuclear-tipped Tomahawk cruise missile 
(TLAM-N, range 2500 km) are now installed in 53 submarines 
and 35 surface combatants. The Soviet counterpart SS-N-21 
(range 3000 km) is now installed in 21 submarines and the older 
models with 100-550 km ranges in 58 submarines and 80 surface 
combatants.21 During fiscal years 1980-89, 2021 Tomahawk cruise 
missiles (of the 3994 planned) of four types were produced; 385 
were the TLAM-N version, 179 for surface ships and the rest for 
submarines.29 In addition, 172 US B-52 and 95 B-1B and 75 Soviet 
TU-95 and 15 TU-160 long-range bombers have been equipped 
with long-range cruise missiles.30 New stealth-technology 
versions of cruise missiles are under development. 
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To be realistic, one would expect the US maritime strategy 
to have measurable consequences even in peacetime. To become 
credible, strategies have to be rehearsed and steps taken in 
peacetime to make them operational for crisis and war. Increased 
presence and exercises of the US Navy in the northern waters as 
well as more frequent port calls would be expected. At the same 
time the importance of NATO assets in Iceland, Denmark and 
Norway would increase. Perhaps because such activities could 
alter threat perceptions in the Soviet Union'31 peacetime exercises 
have in fact been few and, so far, neither the Second Fleet nor 
NATO's Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic 
(STANAVFORLANT) have permanent conventional units in the 
Arctic. 
The new maritime strategy is the doctrine of the US Navy 
only. In correct perspective, it needs to be seen as a reaction to 
the relative decline of the Navy in the 1970s and as a stratagem 
in the competition for defence spending. It justifies the so-called 
600-ship navy with 15 carrier battle groups, 4 battleship battle 
groups, 100 attack submarines, marine amphibious forces, etc., 
and the need for different types of cruise missiles. The 600-ship 
target has not yet been reached, but has become closely linked 
with the ability to sustain the strategy. President Reagan's 1990-
91 biennial Department of Defense budget target was intended 
to support 574 deployable battle force ships in 1990.32 
The strategy has also played an important role in reorienting 
naval officers to the verities of naval power after the war in 
Vietnam. It is an answer to the extension of Soviet sea power, 
creates uncertainties in Soviet calculations and thus possibly 
heightens the threshold of war. 
The US maritime strategy connects Northern Europe directly 
with developments in Continental Europe and emphasizes the 
importance of the northern seas, although the timing and order 
of relative importance of world-wide operations would be 
reweighed in an actual crisis. The accumulation of US and Soviet 
naval strength has increased the likelihood of horizontal 
escalation into the High North. 
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5 CANADIAN AND NORDIC 
PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY 
Finland, Sweden and Norway, each in their own way, provide a 
zone between the superpowers, which has served to assure each 
superpower that its vital interests would be respected.33  
Finland has taken into account the security interests of the 
Soviet Union while firmly safeguarding her own. The foundation 
of relations between Finland and the Soviet Union is the Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FMCA) 
signed in 1948, which acknowledges "Finland's desire to remain 
outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers". Finnish 
foreign policy is an active and peace-oriented policy of neutrality. 
Ever since 1814, Sweden has pursued a policy of being 
unaligned in peacetime and staying neutral in time of war. 
Swedish neutrality is a unilaterally declared policy. 
Norway and Denmark belong to NATO but have declared 
certain limitations on their memberships. These pertain to nuclear 
weapons policies, the stationing of foreign troops and border 
activities and are intended to dissuade the superpowers from 
increasing their involvement in the region. 
Iceland lacks a military defence of her own. In accordance 
with the 1951 defence treaty between Iceland and the United 
States, a US contingent is permanently stationed in Iceland. Its 
main tasks are connected with the NATO surveillance and 
intelligence-gathering system in the North Atlantic. Iceland has 
placed a restriction on her membership in NATO to the effect 
that nuclear weapons should not be stationed in the country. 
Canadian defence policy is based on a strategy of collective 
security within the framework of NATO, with particular 
attention paid to developments in American military strategy 
and defence policy. Canada, like Iceland and Norway, has an 
additional bilateral security relationship with the United States. 
Norway 
Norway has been affected most by the naval activities in the 
High North. The activities are mainly linked to the rivalry 
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between the two superpowers and thus do not imply a threat 
aimed primarily at Norway. 
The expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet caused great 
anxiety in Norway in the early 1970s. The Norwegians envisaged 
a gradual change in the "Nordic balance" and attempted to 
draw attention to NATO's northern, "forgotten" flank. 
Johan Holst has suggested that the Soviet Union's primary 
interest in northern waters is likely to be the protection of SSBN 
launching zones and transit routes. Other probable concerns are 
to prevent the Norwegian Sea being used for carrier-based air 
strikes against the USSR, and the destruction of US ASW barriers 
in the GIUK gap and off northern Norway.34 
Norwegian assessments seem to regard the interdiction of 
the Atlantic sea-lines as the major objective of the Northern 
Fleet, rather than the protection of the SSBN force. The argument 
that Norway could then "fall behind the Soviet lines" is much 
used in the Norwegian debate.35 
The Soviet peace-time ground forces in the Kola area hardly 
pose a threat to northern Norway. Paradoxically, the importance 
of the Kola Peninsula to the Soviet posture in a global war 
provides a certain protection to Norway against the threat of a 
limited attack for limited objectives, since such an attack could 
easily jeopardize the Soviets' vital interests in avoiding 
escalation.36 As long as Norway restricts her national forces to 
defence, and makes that defence credible, an invasion of Norway 
is of questionable strategic usefulness to Moscow.37 Nevertheless, 
part of a broader East/West confrontation in Europe, most 
western military planners believe that Soviet contingency 
planning includes the neutralization of installations in northern 
Norway, to prevent the West from gaining command of the 
Norwegian Sea.38 
The US military interests in northern Norway grew in the 
early 1980s with the new maritime strategy. In 1981 a bilateral 
agreement was signed with Norway on the pre-positioning of 
contingency stocks for an amphibious brigade of US Marines. 
The Western "Teamwork 84" exercise was conducted with the 
objective of operating carrier battle groups in the Norwegian 
Sea combined with amphibious landing operations in Northern 
Norway. 
During 1986 a debate emerged regarding the desirability of 
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requesting the United States to deploy US naval units on a more 
permanent basis off the Norwegian coast. The issue of how to 
counter the military and political impact of the Soviet Union's 
new naval capabilities and forward defence strategy is likely to 
remain and to become linked to broader political questions.39 
In the view of some Norwegian observers an emphasis on 
forward naval operations combined with an extensive 
deployment of dual-capable, ship-based cruise missiles could 
lead to an intensive naval competition in the Northeast Atlantic, 
with ominous repercussions for the surrounding littoral states. 
A build-up of sea-launched cruise missiles harbours the danger 
of inadvertent escalation and lowers the nuclear threshold.40 
The defence of Norway's territory depends upon maximum 
use of her own resources and making credible preparations for 
the swift, safe arrival and deployment of external reinforcements 
in an emergency. The credibility of allied reinforcements is 
sustained by the pre-stocking programme, to provide for their 
early arrival by air, and the regular programme of reinforcement 
and field service exercises involving NATO and Norwegian 
forces.`" It is estimated that if the ACE (Allied Command Europe) 
Mobile Force were deployed to Norway it could arrive in six 
days. Moving by air, the 4th US Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) could reach Trondelag, where material is pre-stocked for 
it, within eight days. The UK — Netherlands Commando Brigade 
could arrive by sea within ten days.42 Stored in northern Norway 
are equipment, fuel and ammunition for the ACE Mobile Force, 
oversnow vehicles for the UK Third Commando Brigade, and 
equipment for two brigades earmarked for transfer from 
southern to northern Norway.43  
Until 1987 the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade 
Group (CAST BG) was the only external force specifically 
earmarked for the reinforcement of Norway. In that year, 
however, Canada judged it impractical to continue this 
earmarking as the timely arrival of this force had always been 
questionable. Canada's decision has caused some dismay in 
Norway. The so-called Europeanization of defence and security 
policy is a question that has been widely discussed. Even the 
British assistance in the defence of northern Norway would 
tend to look more like a British national interest than an allied 
interest» Likewise, the presence of US Marines in Norway would 
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be linked to the US maritime strategy. 
CAST is to be replaced with a multinational force comprising 
a Canadian infantry battalion, a US field artillery battalion and 
a field artillery battalion from West Germany. The new force is 
expected to be about 2500 strong, about half the size of the 
Canadian Brigade.45  
The developments in the High North appear to enhance 
the strategic value of Norwegian territory. For geographical 
reasons, Norway sees the Soviet Northern Fleet not only as a 
global factor but as a subregional threat. "What is defensive to 
Moscow is offensive to Oslo." However, while the Norwegians 
attach special concern to the growth of Soviet naval power, they 
do not predict any changes in Soviet policy towards Scandinavia. 
The Norwegians are concerned by the arens race in the 
waters adjacent to Norway. If the defence of Norway depends 
primarily upon the US security guarantee, it could be drawn 
into a conflict that has nothing to do with the defence of Norway. 
The Norwegians have developed a dual response to the US 
maritime strategy. On the one hand they are attempting to tie 
the United States more specifically to an early defence of 
Norwegian territory and want it to demonstrate its ability to 
bring adequate naval forces into the Norwegian Sea. On the 
other hand, they are anxious to discourage any strike against 
Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula as this is seen as a dangerous, 
war-escalating move. One might say that Norwegian security 
policy stresses the management of peacetime relations rather 
than wartime scenarios. 
As Holst puts it, in Norwegian policy the "fear of 
abandonment competes with the fear of being drawn into 
extraneous competitions. The protector should be within reach, 
but be at arm's length." While it is clear that the presence of 
allies should exist in the NATO context rather than in a bilateral 
relationship with the US, it is just as clear that Western Europe 
cannot replace the United States as the principal guarantor of 
Norwegian security.47 
The US and Norway necessarily have different perspectives 
on defence. The Norwegian concept of "deterrence and 
reassurance" is not always compatible with current US strategic 
thinking where the primary emphasis is on "deterrence". US 
arrangements that may contribute to deterrence, may not 
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necessarily contribute to the defence of Norway should 
deterrence fail. And they may have the undesirable effect of 
linking the Norwegian Sea to conflict spots elsewhere.$ It is 
important to see Norway's strategic position in the Atlantic 
relation and the defence of Norway in its European context.49 
Canada 
In June 1987 Canada released its first Defence White Paper since 
1971. Looking ahead for the next 15 years; ° Canada saw the 
Arctic Ocean as an area of growing strategic importance and as 
an important passage between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. 
Increasing use of the region by submarines, the Paper noted, 
raises both sovereignty and security concerns for Canada. 
There is a growing feeling in Canada that for both 
superpowers the naval importance of the Arctic in increasing, 
and that serious defence issues are arising which might require 
a major shift in Canadian defence resources. For Canada, the 
military issues stem largely from the potential capabilities of 
Soviet long-range cruise missiles and the maritime strategy of 
the US Navy.51 Disputes have arisen between Canada and the 
United States, for example, over the issue of free navigation 
through the Northwest Passage. 
Canada has embarked on a programme of vigorous naval 
modernization, whose goals are greater flexibility, a more 
appropriate balance among air, surface and underwater assets 
and the reorientation of Canadian naval forces towards effective 
operations in the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic." The Navy 
has thus been assigned the task of detecting and deterring hostile 
intrusion in the Arctic. The modernization programme included 
a plan to acquire 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines, which 
are seen as the only vessels capable of exercising surveillance 
and control in the Arctic. The submarine project was cancelled 
in April 1989. Instead, the existing four Tribal-class destroyers 
will be reconfigured to an area air defence role and twelve new 
patrol frigates will be built during the next six years. 
Greater attention will be devoted to surveillance, both 
underwater and space-based, and to technologies aimed at 
assisting the Canadian Forces in asserting sovereignty in the 
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Arctic. This will include installing a fixed, under-ice surveillance 
system. The eleven long-range radars of the North Warning 
System (NWS) became operational at the end of 1988.53 The 
NWS of 11 long- and 36 short-range radar installations will 
stretch from Alaska across the Canadian Arctic and down the 
coast of Labrador. The system will replace the Distant Early 
Warning Line (the DEW line) and will be fully operational by 
1992. 
Earlier, Canada had been committed to transporting a 
Canadian-based brigade group and two fighter squadrons to 
Norway in time of war. However, the Canadian government 
concluded in 1987 that it could make a more effective 
contribution to NATO by assigning the brigade group to 
southern Germany, enabling it to field a newly equipped land 
division there. The two Rapid Reinforcement fighter squadrons 
were similarly reassigned to Germany. A Canadian battalion 
group will remain committed to NATO's northern region as 
part of the ACE Mobile Force (Land). 
Iceland 
The changing naval strategies of the superpowers can be 
expected to increase the importance of Iceland as part of the 
NATO surveillance and intelligence gathering system. Iceland 
has also become geographically more central to the likely battle 
area north of the GIUI< gap. 
The task of the US force in Iceland is to defend Icelandic 
territory and to assure the security of the neighbouring sea area. 
Iceland's contribution to NATO's common defence, providing 
land for an American base, is vital for both NATO and Iceland. 
As Bjorn Bjarnason notes, "No reasonable argument can lead to 
the conclusion that it is plausible for Iceland to be in NATO 
without defence installations on the island itself".54 Following a 
policy change in the years 1983-85, Iceland has gradually become 
more involved within the Alliance. Since 1984 she has been 
represented by a civilian on the Military Committee, and since 
1987 by an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group.55 
The US operates military bases at Keflavik and Hofn, which 
are under the operational command of the US Navy. Navy and 
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Air Force personnel together number around 3000. The 
importance of the GIUK gap in NATO thinking seems 
undiminishing: eighteen F-15 fighters, two AWACS aircraft and 
nine Orion P-3C maritime patrol aircraft are deployed to Iceland. 
Apart from providing for the defence of Iceland, the main 
wartime contingency role for the Keflavik base includes ASW 
operations, air support of naval operations in the North Atlantic 
and support for reinforcement operations from the United States 
to Europe. In response to the expansion of the Soviet bomber 
force and the deployment of cruise missiles, the Icelandic 
government recently authorized a project to upgrade the air 
barrier in the GIUK gap by increasing the air defence capabilities 
of the Keflavik base.56 
Denmark 
Denmark's defence planning recognizes the importance of the 
country to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For NATO, control 
of Danish territory, waters and airspace is of vital importance to 
the defence of southern Norway, northern Germany and the 
United Kingdom. The Soviet Union in turn, would regard control 
of Denmark of great value to support more sustained operations 
against NATO sea-lines of communications if an initial blitz 
failed. The Soviets also see Denmark as a base from which 
NATO could launch deep strikes into the heart of the Warsaw 
Pact.57 
The waters off eastern Greenland have become an important 
arena for the naval rivalry between the superpowers and the 
waters west of Greenland are acquiring some real military 
significance. Greenland will continue to hold considerable 
strategic interest for the foreseeable future and its role in the 
defence of NATO and the American continent will continue to 
be significant. Denmark's Arctic security policy is likely to remain 
low-profile and reactive.58 
The defence of Greenland is entrusted to the United States, 
in accordance with the Treaty of 1951. In the event of war the 
Danish Greenland Command would become part of SACLANT, 
and the American bases would continue under the US Space 
Command.59 The Faroes would come under the protection of 
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the UK air defence scheme.6° Thus, for Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands, most of the defence effort is expected to be undertaken 
by allied forces.61 The US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
station at Thule in Greenland and the radar station at the airbase 
at Torshavn in the Faroe Islands have been modernized. The 
future of the four DEW installations in Greenland is uncertain. 
The defence of Denmark itself is clearly concentrated upon 
denying the enemy use of the Western Baltic and passage 
through the Danish Straits. The defence of Denmark is also 
closely integrated with the defence of Germany north of the 
Elbe River, which ties Denmark to the situation in continental 
Europe. Denmark's national defence forces are largely tailored 
to defending the Baltic Straits. The Royal Danish Navy consists 
mainly of light units and both the Army and the Air Force 
depend on external reinforcements. 
The Danish Defence Commission of 1988 viewed measures 
aimed at creating optimum conditions for reinforcements, 
coupled with maximum protection in the reception phase, to 
represent a major task for the Danish defence in peacetime. 
Careful preparation will in the event help to safeguard 
deployment of reinforcements and thus have an inherent war-
preventive effect, and will also help to give the reinforcement 
instrument maximum flexibility in the context of crisis 
management. A stepped-up national effort on the part of 
Denmark becomes relevant in terms of the United Kingdom 
Mobile Force and any closer linking of the 9th US Infantry 
Division to the BALTAP area and in terms of the British and US 
air reinforcements.62 
Danish security is often discussed in a Nordic rather than 
in a broader European perspective. It is difficult, however, to 
see any direct impact of the strategic developments in the 
northern waters on Danish security policy, or even on the security 
issues of Greenland. 
Sweden 
The opposing interests of the military alliances are of direct 
concern to the neutral nations of Sweden and Finland in the far 
north (Lapland) and in the Baltic Sea. As neither borders directly 
on the Arctic Ocean, there are similarities in their assessment of 
the situation in Northern Europe. Increased military activities in 
the northern sea areas are seen as an indication of heightened 
military interest. 
Since 1814, Sweden has avoided war through a policy of 
armed neutrality. Although unequivocally aligned with the 
Western powers, especially in its economic orientation, Sweden 
nontheless adheres unswervingly to its policy of neutrality. 
Swedish foreign and defence policies have, in general, followed 
a relatively placid course since 1945. In practice, the Swedish 
military has assumed that an attack is most likely to come from 
the East. 
Sweden relies upon a policy of deterrence as well as 
neutrality for preservation of its national security. As a result, 
for many decades the Swedish armed forces have been more 
modern and powerful than those of any other secondary power. 
Because of the centricity of Baltic and Continental European 
concerns in Swedish military thinking, the focus of attention 
has shifted to the northern flank relatively late. In the report of 
the Swedish Defence Committee submitted in 1981, the Northern 
Cap and the Baltic Straits are assumed to be of considerable and 
equal importance to the great power blocs. According to the 
Committee, military operations designed to secure control of 
these areas might be undertaken already in the early stages of a 
war in Europe. In such a situation NATO might have as its 
objective to reinforce Norway and Denmark as quickly as 
possible and to engage the naval and air forces of the Soviet 
Union. The Warsaw Pact could, at the same time, be expected to 
attempt to forestall a NATO build-up and secure freedom of 
operation for its own naval forces. In such a situation demands 
might be made on the use of Swedish territory as a transit area 
on land, sea or in the air, or as a base area for air forces.63  
The Committee of 1978 also foresaw problems arising from 
the American cruise missiles designed for launching from aircraft 
and submarines. This could lead to an increased risk of wartime 
violation of Swedish neutral airspace on the part of both power 
blocks.TM 
The Defence Committee of 1984 underlined in its first report 
in 1985 the growing strategic importance of Northern Europe 
and the North Atlantic area. The basis of this assessment was 
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the increased military presence and activity in the area on the 
part of the major powers, as well as the steps being taken to 
enable them to quickly extend this presence still further." 
Suspected violations of Swedish waters by submarines have 
continued since the grounding of a Soviet Whiskey-class 
submarine in 1981. The submarine violations provoked an 
extensive Swedish debate over national security, so extensive 
that it has somewhat overshadowed the debate over 
developments in the maritime strategies. Some analysts see a 
link between developments in the Norwegian Sea, the submarine 
incidents and the added interest of the major powers in the 
Baltic Sea.66 
According to a Norwegian study, the change in the sea-
power constellation in the North Atlantic was perceived but 
had little influence on Swedish security policy until the early 
eighties.67 With the worsening political climate between the 
superpowers, and the submarine incursions in Swedish waters, 
the situation in the North Atlantic received some attention, but 
without becoming much more dominant in the thinking of 
decision-makers. Overall, it would seem that the direct Swedish-
Soviet relationship and the military situation in the Baltic are of 
more importance to the Swedes than the situation in the North 
Atlantic. Southern Sweden still evidently features most 
prominently in the strategic thinking and it is assumed that 
Swedish neutrality would more likely be challenged in the south 
than in the north.68 
The latest Swedish Defence Committee (1988) submitted an 
interim security policy report in January 1990 entitled "Swedish 
Defence Policy in a Changing World". The report concentrates 
upon the rapid political developments in Eastern Europe, recent 
improvements in East-West relations and possible agreements 
on major arms , cutbacks. These changes obviously affect the 
perception of security challenges and threats in Northern Europe. 
Political cooperation and mutual confidence may become more 
prominent elements in the security policy situation in northern 
Europe and act as a counter-balance to the superpower rivalries 
in the Nordic area and the tensions dependent upon the new 
developments in arms technology. 
The Committee believes that the air-operative dimension 
in the strategic significance of the northern areas has continuously 
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increased. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact see the whole of 
northern Europe as a uniform area for operations. During a 
major crisis in Europe the Nordic areas are likely to be quickly 
affected. The High North has a fundamental nuclear-strategic 
importance which will remain strong for a long time.69 
Sweden's defence planning during most of the 1970s was 
aimed at a gradual reduction of its most capable air, sea, and 
land units in the mistaken belief that detente had come to stay. 
By the mid-1980s, unilateral disarmers were on the retreat. There 
has also been a growing recognition of the need to pursue a firm 
and stable policy of armed neutrality that will contribute to 
stability in the region.70 The reductions in the Swedish armed 
forces have not affected the units earmarked for the defence of 
the Upper Norrland Military Area. 
Sweden has tried to maintain her traditional strong air force. 
In 1982 the domestic JAS Industry Group was contracted to 
develop and build five JAS 39 Gripen prototypes, and an initial 
series of 30 fighters. The total requirement of the Swedish Air 
Force, according to the Supreme Commander's long-term plan, 
amounts to 350-400 aircraft. The fighter made its maiden flight 
on 9 December 1988. However, the first prototype crashed during 
a test flight in February 1989 and the service entry of the initial 
series will be delayed probably to 1993. 
Swedish security policy in the 1990s will be characterized 
by a combination of stability, activity and flexibility. Stability 
and continuity as regards the foundations of foreign and defence 
policies, notably as part of the security pattern in the Nordic 
area and in Europe, are essential elements in Swedish security 
policy. An active foreign policy to promote continued positive 
developments in Europe and to contribute to coordinated 
international efforts to solve global problems is of crucial interest 
from the security policy point of view. Flexibility in the choice 
of the means employed in security policy, to further the objectives 
of Swedish security, is a permanent requirement which is 
becoming more urgent in a situation where the pace of change 
is rapid and assessments of the future are unusually difficult." 
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Finland 
There are no strategic targets in Finland which themselves could 
motivate an attack. The politico-military significance of Finland 
depends first and foremost on the extent to which Finnish 
territory can be exploited in efforts to reach strategic targets 
located close to Finnish territory. An isolated attack against 
Finland is considered unlikely, but a major East-West conflict in 
Europe or world-wide would entail a high risk of involving 
Finnish territory. 
Finland's northernmost areas are situated between the two 
military alliances and in the immediate vicinity of naval bases 
on the coast of the Kola Peninsula. The significance of the 
northern waters in the superpowers' global strategies has long 
been recognized in Finnish military thinking. As early as 1971, 
the Parliamentary Defence Committee71 noted that the strategic 
importance of the Arctic Ocean has increased and that the 
interests of both NATO and the Soviet Union in the Arctic region 
require that their navies be able to carry on their activities in 
northern waters. 
During the 1970s, Finnish official statements recognized 
the sea areas bordering on Northern Europe to be of increasing 
importance for the great powers. Their air and land strategic 
aspirations in the area were considered derivatory upon these 
maritime interests. At the same time, advancing weapons 
technology - especially the new cruise missiles - was seen as 
having profound repercussions on the military-political situation 
of Northern Europe.74 
In a speech in 1986, President Koivisto echoed the conclusion 
of security policy reports from all the Nordic countries, that 
questions of maritime strategy had become considerably more 
important in Northern Europe. Viewing this development as 
clearly apparent, he also argued that it could be expected to 
continue, for several reasons, most of them derivative upon 
military-technological developments. However, the increasing 
strategic interest did not necessarily mean that tension was 
heightening in Northern Europe.75 
Three years later the President considered a decrease in the 
strategic significance of the northern waters possible if 
disarmament measures were to be extended to the navies and if, 
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as a consequence of the START negotiations, land-based missiles 
became favoured by the Soviet strategic nuclear forces.76 
In early 1990 the Finnish Parliamentary Advisory Board for 
Defence Policy reassessed the European security-political 
situation and its future." In spite of many encouraging trends, 
the Board saw signs that the arms race would not slow to a stop 
but rather would be channelled to new areas. The START 
counting rules would seem, in fact, to encourage introducing 
more bombers and air-launched cruise missiles into the 
superpower nuclear arsenals. Likewise, naval forces and long-
range sea-launched cruise missiles, which have an impact on 
the military-political situation in Northern Europe, are not at 
the moment covered by the START negotiations.78 
At the same time the Board noted many encouraging 
features in the relations between the superpowers and in the 
general political atmosphere in Europe. These features were 
expected to have repercussions in the Nordic area in the form of 
a lessening of confrontation. In summary, Finnish defence policy 
attaches great importance to the increasing strategic significance 
of northern Europe and of the northern sea areas in particular, 
and to the threat created by the deployment of cruise missiles. 
Finland is very aware that light weapons systems and other 
equipment designed for the special conditions of northern land 
warfare are not yet on the agenda of any disarmament 
negotiations.79 
From the point of view of both military alliances, Finnish 
and Swedish air space together constitute a wide buffer zone. 
At the same time it is clear that, in the event of crisis, the integrity 
of that air space would quickly come under threat, without any 
violations of land or sea areas having necessarily occurred. The 
rapid development of cruise missile systems and their 
deployment, rather than the maritime strategies themselves, have 
therefore been of particular concern to both countries. 
During the past few years there has been considerable 
debate in Finland over the dangers associated with US 
deployment of cruise missiles and the ensuing risk that Finnish 
— and Swedish — airspace would be violated by missiles heading 
for targets in northwestern parts of the USSR. Conversely in the 
case of Soviet missiles, violations could be expected with missiles 
heading for Norway and the North Atlantic. A cruise missile 
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penetrating Finnish airspace would clearly constitute an 
infringement of territorial integrity. Finnish defence planning 
thus calls for infringements to be met by armed force. Recent 
improvements in low-altitude radar systems, as well as exercises 
involving the simulated interception and destruction of cruise 
missiles, should be seen in the light of Finland's need to address 
this new threat to its neutrality.80 
The strategic developments in the North have also led to 
some concrete measures in Lapland. Finland has strengthened, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, her peacetime forces in the 
North. A specially equipped ranger brigade is now operational 
in Sodankylä. In Rovaniemi a new anti-aircraft regiment and 
the Air Force Wing of Lapland are deployed. Within the 
constraints of her resources, Finland is also committed to 
improving her defences against cruise missile overflight. In June 
1988 the Finnish Ministry of Defence placed an order for a 
French Thomson-CFS Crotale NG surface-to-air missile system. 
The acquisition of new Air Force interceptor squadrons with 
look-down, shoot-down capabilities is still pending. 
Some analysts in Finland believe that the developments in 
the High North have had no direct impact on Finnish security. 
The present set-up may be dangerous but it is not unacceptable. 
There has been no change in the Norwegian policy of low-level 
military activity in the north. Nor has there been any significant 
change in the level of conventional forces on the Soviet side. 
Finland has strengthened her defences, but neither Norway nor 
the Soviet Union has interpreted that as detrimental to their 
own security interests.$' The maintenance of the territorial 
integrity of Lapland by Finnish forces is beneficial to the security 
of all sides. 
As much as through military strength, a peaceful future 
will be secured through political means and confidence-building 
measures. Significant efforts have been made, for example in 
promoting a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the North and in 
pursuing initiatives aimed at banning long-range cruise missiles. 
The pattern of the Finnish security policy seeks to counter 
the perceived threats with political responses in order to ensure 
that strategic stability, defensive political objectives and relatively 
low tension continue to characterize the Arctic and Nordic 
regions in spite of the military buildup that has distinguished 
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great-power activities in the area. On several issues, such as 
confidence- and security-building measures, Nordic views are 
close enough to render coordinated action possible. A basis for 
this action is provided by the traditional attempt of the Nordic 
countries to take into account one another's interests regardless 
of their different security policy solutions.81  
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6 CURRENT TRENDS IN EUROPEAN 
SECURITY-POLICY 
Revolutionary changes occurred in Eastern Europe during 1989 
and 1990. The dominance of the United States and the Soviet 
Union is diminishing in Europe as is the relevance of the 
hegemonic alliances. The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and negotiations on conventional armed 
forces in Europe have enhanced human rights and promoted 
confidence-building measures. The arms control agenda is 
broader, more radical and perhaps more promising than ever 
before. 
Amidst changes on this scale and at this pace it is difficult 
to forecast the future. The system which has provided 40 years 
of peace in Europe is eroding rapidly. In the Soviet Union the 
response to change brings with it the risk of instability and even 
anarchy. 
The European system of security commitments will be 
seeking new forms. At the moment, however, commercial and 
economic interests are taking priority over defence 
considerations. The US influence on European security policies 
will probably diminish in pace with the emplacement of the 
new structures of European economic cooperation and efforts 
to achieve a political community. 
The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact is inevitable. 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland are clearly moving toward 
market economies to be integrated with the West. The German 
Democratic Republic ceased to exist in 1990. The future of the 
Soviet Union is unpredictable. Some kind of fracturing of the 
Soviet Union, with the republics acting more independently, 
appears unavoidable. In terms of strategic decision-making, one 
of the key questions will be who is in control of the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal. Most nuclear weapons, though not all, are 
situated in the Russian republic. 
The political climate in Europe has become warmer, and 
the probability of war has lessened. The United States and the 
Soviet Union must, however, still be regarded as rival powers 
and, with their massive nuclear arsenals, as superpowers. The 
situation in the Persian Gulf is one more evidence that the policies 
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of the superpowers are derived from their vital interests, not 
from any ideal of peace on earth at all costs. 
The unilateral force reductions announced by the Soviet 
Union will reduce the imbalance of force levels between the two 
Alliances. In consequence of the reduced force levels one could 
conceive of a higher priority being assigned to quality than to 
quantity, which would encourage an increased operational 
efficiency of both nuclear and conventional forces. The 
Conventional parity between the Alliances enhances stability, 
but it is no guarantee of peace. The force reductions have been 
concentrated in Central Europe and there has been no 
accompanying reduction in the Soviet forces in the Leningrad 
Military District. 
The changes in the politico-military environment in the 
High North have been mainly consequent upon the evolution of 
military technology. The emergence of the Arctic as an important 
strategic area means that it can no more be considered as the 
quiet flank of Europe. The offensive elements of the US and 
Soviet naval strategies were not necessarily causes but rather 
consequences of these developments. 
The number and size of naval exercises in the northern seas 
have distinctly declined in the late 1980s. The presence of US 
naval forces in the Norwegian Sea has not increased. Criticism 
of the US maritime strategy has also been more vocal. The chief 
advocates of the strategy — Lehman, Weinberger and Reagan 
— are all out of office. Greatest pressure comes from attempts to 
reduce the federal budget deficit, which will result in there 
being less than 500 deployable US battle force ships in the near 
future. 
The US maritime strategy, as such, is feasible, including the 
forward operations of the US Navy against the Soviet naval 
capabilities. The strategy in the area of responsibility of 
SACLANT can hardly be implemented with less than seven 
carrier battle groups. 
The risk of an armed conflict in the High North has clearly 
decreased. A realistic analysis can, however, only include an 
elucidation of the geostrategic conditions and the available 
military capacity. Good intentions can change for the worse 
rapidly. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The last twenty years have seen a gradual increase in the strategic 
significance of the High North. Geopolitics, strategies and 
weapons technologies have all contributed to the change. 
The interests of the superpowers in the High North are tied 
up with the dynamics of the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union 
has a strong physical presence by the Arctic basin. The Kola 
bases have a strategic value for the Soviet Union, not a regional 
one. Similarly the US maritime strategy is just a fraction of the 
global strategy of flexible response where stages of horizontal 
and vertical escalation are an important element. 
The timing and order of importance of world-wide 
operations will be weighed at the actual time of crisis. If the 
roots of a crisis he in the third world, an escalation to the Arctic 
is not inevitable. A Eurocentric crisis, on the other hand, would 
rapidly create a sub-theatre in the High North, where even the 
first shots of the war might be fired. But in no sense could the 
High North ever be a cause of war, nor will it be an area where 
the outcome of war is decided. 
Neither the risk of war nor the tension in the area has 
increased. The actions of all parties have been restrained and at 
least the surface operations continue at a low level. 
The dangerous mixture of conventional and nuclear 
weapons in the navies of both superpowers and the sparse 
population in the High North could tempt the use of nuclear 
weapons demonstratively and inadvertently lead to nuclear war. 
The military presence in the North would then have not only 
regional consequences, but increase the risk of general nuclear 
war. 
If significant reductions are made in strategic nuclear 
weapons, changes in threat perceptions in the Arctic can be 
expected. If cuts are carried out primarily in ballistic missiles, 
the importance of long-range cruise missiles and other air-
breathing vehicles will increase correspondingly. This 
development would be encouraged by the political difficulties 
in modernizing short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and by 
the need to create a strategic missile defence. 
Submarine-launched cruise missiles will maintain some 
invulnerability, but to maintain firing capability the submarines 
must operate close to the littorals of the Arctic. The Arctic will 
also continue to be a major theatre for the operations of manned 
bombers equipped with ALCMs. The Soviet Union might begin 
to strengthen its strategic bomber force and to increase its 
penetration ability. The United States might begin to rebuild her 
air defences and create a cruise missile defence. As the shortest 
trajectory of strategic air assets crosses over the Arctic Ocean, 
both superpowers might decide to extend their surveillance and 
defences into this man's land. 
Northern Europe is no longer a peripheral area. The growing 
superpower rivalry in the High North presents a threat to Nordic 
security on the sea and in the air, rather than on the ground. 
Naval developments have not changed the basic premises of 
the security policies of the Nordic countries and Canada, which 
are shaped by many other factors as well. Nor can these countries 
have much influence on maritime developments. 
Owing to their geostrategic differences the Nordic countries 
and Canada each have a slightly different perspective on military-
political developments in the North. A certain slowness in 
perceiving the changes in the strategic environment has been 
apparent. Nevertheless, all countries share a concern about the 
military build-up in the Kola area. 
Norway and Canada are the most exposed countries and 
their security policies are constructed with a strong eye to 
strategic developments in the High North. The strategic 
significance of Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands in 
surveillance has increased. Denmark depends for her defence 
on Germany and thus the situation in Continental Europe. Both 
Sweden and Finland have strengthened their military assets in 
the northern parts of their countries. Keeping in mind the 
geographical constraints, these forces would be able to repel a 
major attack in the northern region. All the Nordic countries 
and Canada have combined the requirement for a conceivably 
sufficient defence with an active search for tension-reducing 
measures. 
The Soviet Union will continue to maintain a strong presence 
in the Arctic. The attention of the United States will be directed 
to Alaska and to closer ties with Canada, Greenland (Denmark), 
Iceland and Norway. 
E 
Peace and security in the High North is bound to the 
principle of sustained progress in East-West relations. All 
indications point to a common interest in preserving a low level 
of tension in the area. 
The Arctic Ocean can be expected to gain in strategic 
importance in the future and to become an increasingly focal 
area for military operations. Under-ice operations will increase 
as the enabling technologies are developed. The air-space of the 
Arctic will continue to be important for purposes of early 
warning and as a route for strategic air assets. 
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DOCUMENTATION 
Report of the Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence 
Policy; 28 February 1990; 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY-
POLITICAL SITUATION, ITS DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS 
AND ITS IMPACT ON FINNISH DEFENCE POLICY*) 
TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
On 15 December 1988, the Government appointed a Parliamentary 
Advisory Board for Defence Policy with the tasks of acting as a 
discussion forum and an information channel between the main political 
parties and the defence administration, of assessing the security situation 
of Finland, and of making suggestions and statements on matters 
administered by the Ministry of Defence as well as other aspects of 
national defence, when necessary. 
Bank Director Jaakko Iloniemi was asked to be the Chairman of the 
Advisory Board, and a total of 21 representatives of the main political 
parties and of the state administration were nominated as members, 
alternate members, and secretaries. 
On 24 May 1989, the Ministry of Defence requested the Advisory Board 
to prepare a report by the end of 1989 assessing the European security-
political situation and its future prospects. 
First of the two reports prepared by the Parliamentary Advisory Board for 
Defence Policy. The second report of 19 December 1990, which assesses 
present capabilities of the Defence Forces and contains the recommendations 
of the Board on defence expenditures for the 1990s, will be published in the 
next issue (Finnish Defence Studies 3,1991). 
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The Advisory Board has now compiled this report, after being granted 
an extension of two months. The assessment also includes a discussion 
of the effects of the European security-political situation on Finnish 
defence policy. 
The report compiled by the Advisory Board consists of three parts. The 
first part considers the general changes taking place in Europe, the 
second part deals with the military-political changes, and the third 
part discusses the effects of the European situation on Finnish defence 
policy. 
The Advisory Board hereby respectfully submits its report to the 
Ministry of Defence. 
Helsinki, 28 February 1990 
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1 CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN EUROPE SINCE 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
The international system is at the moment going through a period of 
profound transition that will change the existing power structures and 
the contents of policies as well as influence fundamental security 
concepts. If the positive developments continue and if serious setbacks 
are avoided, the chances of escaping from the post-war situation, 
characterized by confrontation between alliances and by the arms race, 
will improve. Also, the new global challe' ges — environmental problems 
being the most significant — will require increased cooperation and 
thus promote international security. 
The recent changes in Europe have been surprising, rapid and far-
reaching. The momentous societal changes in Eastern Europe and the 
general and rapid acceptance of German unification are significant in 
terms of security policy. The collapse of political systems based on the 
supremacy of one political party — which, with the exception of 
Romania, has taken place peacefully — and the transition towards 
democratic multi-party systems; the opening of the Berlin Wall; and 
the recognition of basic human rights are essentially eliminating the 
division of Europe that was established after the Second World War. 
These changes were launched by popular dissatisfaction in each country 
with the economic and political situation. The fact that the changes 
have mainly taken place peacefully and that there has been a decline in 
the degree of confrontation between different political systems has 
already within a short period of time created strong and apparently 
well-founded expectations of a peaceful future. 
The changes have been so rapid and radical that caution must be 
exercised in assessing their security policy effects, particularly for the 
long term. 
The post-war international system has been characterized by 
confrontation and competition between the superpowers — the United 
States and the Soviet Union — and in Europe between the military 
alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This competition has created 
military-political tension that has fueled a quantitative and qualitative 
arms race, which has had its main effects in Europe. 
Although the structure of military and political relations in post-war 
Europe has remained stable, the political climate has fluctuated 
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considerably. The periods of detente have tended to be short-lived. On 
the other hand, more and more global and regional structures of 
cooperation have been created in the international system, so that the 
strict bipolarity of the early Cold War years has lost much of its 
significance. The creation of new economic and political power centers 
has had a similar effect. 
The expectations from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe in the mid-1970s were not fully realized. Instead, towards the 
end of the 1970s, the world faced a tense international situation with 
poor superpower relations, an extensive arms buildup, increased 
difficulties in achieving progress in disarmament, and aggravation of 
regional crises and armed conflicts in various parts of the world. The 
negative effects of these factors were also felt in Europe, even though 
the CSCE process continued and its earlier achievements softened the 
impact of this crisis on our continent. 
The summit meeting between the U.S. and Soviet leaders in 1985 in 
Geneva seems to have been a turning point in this process. At this 
meeting they reached a mutual understanding on the unacceptability 
of nuclear war, and on the necessity of preventing other kinds of wars; 
they revived disarmament negotiations, started to improve their bilateral 
relations and began to negotiate the settlement of regional conflicts. 
The political understandings achieved by the superpowers on various 
issues since then, and the continuous summit-level contacts between 
them have stabilized the international situation and improved the 
political atmosphere. 
In recent years, the essential improvement in the international situation, 
based on mutual understanding between the superpowers, has had 
significant results. With the help of the superpowers, certain regional 
conflicts in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central 
America have either been alleviated or settled. Even though the role of 
the superpowers in these efforts has been significant, it has not always 
been sufficient by itself. The willingness of the parties involved in 
regional conflicts to achieve political solutions and the contribution of 
the United Nations have also been indispensable. 
In the improved international atmosphere, even the CSCE process has 
gained momentum and produced more tangible results. Since it has 
continued already for almost twenty years as a multilateral negotia-
tion process on many levels, it has clearly become a factor contributing 
to the stability of the European security system. In spite of some 
temporary setbacks, the results and experiences of the CSCE process 
during the past years have only strengthened the potential of this 
process. 
As a result of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, the traditional 
"baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act have gained more substance in 
terms of the human dimension; mutual understanding has for the first 
time been achieved on the question of follow-up meetings in the field 
of economic cooperation; and the so-called CSBM negotiations on 
confidence-and-security-building measures have been launched in the 
field of military security. Moreover, negotiations on conventional armed 
forces in Europe between the 23 countries that are members of military 
alliances are currently being carried out within the CSCE framework. 
With this new set of negotiations, the CSCE process has also become a 
forum of cooperation between the military alliances, which is also 
demonstrated by the Vienna seminar on military doctrines. 
The role of the neutral and non-aligned countries in the CSCE process 
has been important from the start. On the one hand, CSCE has been a 
unique opportunity for them to express their own views. On the other 
hand, they have also been able to work out compromises between the 
other two groups' positions and consensus decisions have often been 
possible on the basis of these compromises. 
The speed of change in the CSCE process since 1986 is promising for 
the follow-up meeting that will start in March 1992. 
It has been proposed that the mandate for a CSCE summit meeting 
that may convene prior to the 1992 follow-up meeting should include a 
multilateral discussion of the changes that have occurred in the 
European political system, so that these changes should not have a 
negative effect on stability. Thus the CSCE process has become a 
politically important instrument of controlled change, which is a point 
that is considered more significant today than ever before in the course 
of the CSCE process. 
In the field of economic relations, regional integration especially within 
the European Community has developed further and with greater 
speed than general European cooperation. The EC has announced its 
goal of completing an internal market by the end of 1992, with a free 
movement of goods, persons, capital and services. At the same time, 
negotiations on cooperation between the EC and EFTA have intensified. 
The goal here is to create a European Economic Space (EES). 
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The economic crisis in the Soviet Union and in the other Eastern 
European countries makes it, on the one hand., more difficult for them 
to solve their societal and political as well as economic and 
environmental problems. On the other hand, it also weakens their 
chances of integration into the world economy. It seems that not only 
total societal reforms but even extensive Western economic aid and 
investments are needed in order to solve the economic problems of 
Eastern Europe. In this situation, the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
European countries are attempting to improve their relations with the 
economic organizations of Western Europe, i.e., EC and EFTA. The 
political changes taking place in Eastern Europe tend to make economic, 
technical and environmental cooperation easier and — by underlining 
common concerns, needs and interests — to strengthen the concept of 
common security. 
The deepening economic cooperation within the European Community 
goes hand in hand with efforts to achieve a political community. So 
far, these efforts have come to fruition primarily in the form of increasing 
foreign policy cooperation and coordination. At times, defence policy 
cooperation has been discussed, but this is still a controversial issue. 
On the other hand, some EC member countries can discuss defence 
policy cooperation in the Western European Union, WEU, if they wish. 
The expansion and strengthening of the EC is about to create the 
world's biggest unified market, and the competitive potential of the 
EC in comparison with the United States and Japan is increasing. 
However, inside the EC there are varying opinions on the final goals of 
integration and perhaps, above all, on the relation between national 
states and EC decision-making. 
It becomes more difficult to outline a comprehensive picture, if we 
take into account the efforts to create a European Economic Space and 
the need to construct cooperative relations with the East European 
countries as well as to develop all-European economic cooperation. It 
is, however, quite obvious that the EC will play a central role in the 
process of change. The differences in the level of economic development 
between Western and Eastern Europe create instabilities, which, on the 
other hand, underlines the need for all-European economic cooperation. 
The deep changes and the security-political debates of recent years 
have been accelerated by the Soviet policies of perestroika, glasnost 
and new foreign policy thinking. This process has clearly increased 
confidence between the Soviet Union and the West and opened a 
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dialogue between them. It has also made it possible for a national 
reform process to begin within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. 
The difficult economic situation both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Europe has made societal changes indispensable and also accelerated 
them. This, in turn, has undermined the political structures created in 
these countries in the post-war period. On the other hand, the emergence 
of the nationality issue has in some countries led to an aggravation of 
national contradictions and even to intra-national armed conflicts. 
The general political atmosphere in Europe is improving, and the 
probability of war has decreased. However, the great societal, economic, 
political and national changes have brought forward numerous new 
factors of uncertainty. 
2 POLITICAL-MILITARY CHANGE 
Recent assessments of the development of the European military 
situation have been strongly influenced by progress achieved in 
disarmament negotiations. In particular, the experiences gained through 
the CSBM measures which were agreed in Stockholm in 1986 - 
notification and observation of military exercises as well as on-site 
inspections — have been thoroughly positive. The Stockholm agreement 
has significantly increased the openness and predictability of military 
activities in Europe. 
The CSBM measures agreed in Stockholm were an important step 
forward, and the experiences gained through their implementation 
were used in negotiating the INF Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons in 1987. According to this treaty, all the land-based 
intermediate range nuclear missiles of the United States and the Soviet 
Union will be removed from their launchers and destroyed. Moreover, 
the treaty contains far-reaching compliance and verification measures, 
some of which are carried out at the gates of missile-producing factories, 
in missile storage areas and at missile destruction sites. The practical 
experiences gained in putting the treaty in effect have proven to be 
positive, especially in the field of verification. Even though the total 
number of nuclear weapons will not be much reduced by this treaty, it 
has been a significant step forward in the field of nuclear disarmament. 
The positive political effect of the treaty has been apparent both in 
Europe and in relations between the superpowers. 
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In addition to the results that have already been achieved, progress can 
be detected in the on-going disarmament negotiations. The United 
States and the Soviet Union have already outlined in the Geneva START 
negotiations the principles of a treaty, whose purpose is to reduce 
substantially the number of strategic nuclear weapons, including a 
50% reduction in heavy ballistic missiles. 
The United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has 
conducted discussions on banning all nuclear weapon tests, but actual 
negotiations on this issue have not yet been started. Moreover, the 
United States and the Soviet Union have negotiated on effective 
verification mechanisms for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and 
its complementary treaty, the Treaty on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful 
Purposes, signed in 1976. 
It is still important to guarantee the existing nuclear-weapons-free 
status of the Nordic region. A working group of officials, which was 
appointed by the Nordic governments in 1987, is still examining the 
preconditions for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Nordic region as 
part of detente and disarmament efforts in Europe. 
Moreover, there is a possibility that a treaty banning chemical weapons 
will be completed soon. 
The disarmament negotiations conducted within the CSCE framework 
in Vienna are of central importance for the security of Europe. The 
breakthrough achieved in the Stockholm meeting in 1986 in developing 
CSBM measures, and especially in agreeing verification procedures, 
created preconditions that were needed in order to start negotiating 
actual disarmament measures in Europe. 
It is the task of the CSBM negotiations in Vienna among all 35 CSCE 
countries to outline and accept several complementary CSBM measures, 
designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The 
objectives of the negotiations among the 23 member countries of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) 
are to establish a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at 
lower levels, to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, 
and to eliminate, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching 
a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. 
The objectives expressed in the mandate of the CFE talks will be 
achieved through reductions, limitations, restructuring of armed forces, 
52 
common quotas and various stabilizing measures. The subjects of 
negotiation are land-based conventional armed forces and their 
armaments and equipment. Dual-purpose systems, i.e., those weapons 
capable of launching or carrying nuclear warheads in addition to 
conventional charges, are also included in the agenda of these talks, 
but the nuclear warheads or chemical weapons themselves are not 
included. Furthermore, naval forces are excluded from the negotiations. 
The objective of the CFE talks is to reduce the number of tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters 
and military personnel stationed by the military alliances in Europe. If 
the presently tabled proposals were realized, it would mean that these 
armaments and personnel located in the area of application — from the 
Atlantic to the Urals — would be significantly reduced. In quantitative 
terms, the reductions would be primarily felt in the Warsaw Pact 
countries, whose superiority is substantial in most of the weapon 
categories listed above. For instance, the number of tanks in the Warsaw 
Pact countries would be reduced to less than 50 % of their present 
number. 
However, even if the treaty proposals were realized, there would still 
be a total of 40,000 tanks, almost 60,000 armoured combat vehicles, 
about 40,000 artillery pieces, about 10,000 combat aircraft and some 
4,000 combat helicopters left in the area of application. 
According to the official proposal of the Warsaw Pact now on the 
table, both alliances would be allowed to deploy a total of 1.35 million 
soldiers in the area of application. NATO has not proposed any 
restrictions on military personnel other than on the U.S. and Soviet 
troops stationed outside their home countries. According to the NATO 
proposal, the United States and the Soviet Union would each be allowed 
to have 195,000 soldiers in Central Europe. In addition, the United 
States would be allowed to have a total of 30,000 soldiers in Spain, 
Great Britain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. According to the existing 
proposals, the number and location of armaments and personnel would 
be closely regulated by quotas, ceilings and regional sub-limits. 
So far, the 23 countries have been able to agree only on the definition 
of artillery. Such questions as definitions for all the other weapon 
categories, regional sub-limits, storage areas, stabilizing measures and 
verification of compliance still remain to be solved. At the moment, the 
numbers mentioned in the tabled proposals are tentative, and the 
personnel issue is also awaiting resolution. However, there is strong 
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political will to conclude a CFE treaty already during 1990, which has 
been repeatedly stated in the summit meetings of the superpowers and 
the military alliances. 
Strengthening and the further development of the existing CSBM 
measures are an important part of the CSCE process. This is of particular 
importance for the countries outside the military alliances.These 
countries' armed forces can be activated to their full strength only 
through mobilization and can consequently be characterized as 
defensive. Therefore, the neutral and non-aligned countries have paid 
attention to the necessity of broadening the exchange of military 
information as well as extending it to all military services. Units and 
weapon systems belonging to the ground forces of the military alliances 
that have the ability to carry out surprise attacks and deep offensive 
operations are of special concern in the proposal of the neutral and 
non-aligned countries tabled in Vienna. The NNA-countries regard 
airborne and amphibious landing operations as specially threatening, 
and they have therefore proposed that the obligation to provide 
information on such operations should be expanded. 
The development of the German question is important for the internal 
situation of the military alliances as well as for their mutual relations. 
As a result, it is also important for the prospects of disarmament. 
The disarmament prospects that have opened up in Europe have a 
great impact on inter-alliance relations as well as on the situation 
within the alliances. The direct and indirect effects of disarmament in 
Europe will obviously be far-reaching. 
The Warsaw Pact is going through a profound process of change, 
where military factors are only a part of the whole. The economic 
pressures caused by military spending are greatest in the Soviet Union, 
where the defence expenditure's share of GNP is very high. According 
to some Soviet estimates, it is as high as 15-20 % of the Soviet GNP. 
Therefore, the Soviet Union has announced that it is going to carry out 
unilateral reductions in its defence budgets and armed forces and 
reorganize its military forces according to defensive principles. A similar 
process is going on in the other Warsaw Pact countries. The security-
political value of these measures is substantial, even though unilateral 
cuts have not significantly reduced the capability of the armed forces. 
Agreements have already been concluded on the withdrawal of the 
Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and discussions have 
continued on withdrawing troops from Poland. 
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The reorganization and unilateral cuts carried out by the Warsaw Pact 
countries are prompted both by internal factors and by political-military 
objectives. Reductions in the personnel of the armed forces will release 
labour forces, and it is hoped that the re-structuring of the defence 
industry will release both planning and production resources for the 
civilian sectors of the national economies. In addition, one goal of 
reorganization of the armed forces is to increase their capability, 
eliminate excessive bureaucracy and intensify training. 
The process of disarmament will also have a considerable impact on 
the Western Alliance. Conventional disarmament — although it will 
primarily lead to a reduction in the offensive power of the Warsaw 
Pact and to the reorganization of its military forces — will create pressures 
on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to reduce American troops deployed 
in Europe. The Western Alliance has stated that positive results in the 
CFE negotiations are a precondition for starting negotiations on short-
range nuclear missiles. The debate within NATO on these missiles, as 
well as on just and equal sharing of the defence burden, will continue 
and probably accelerate. Real cuts have been made in the defence 
budget of the United States during recent years. As a result, the funds 
earmarked for NATO will probably be examined with particular care 
in the U.S. Congress. 
In the political sense, the alliances are facing a new situation. The 
strong emphasis that was placed on building up military forces in the 
beginning of the 1980s has revealed both in the East and the West the 
financial strains and limits of arms races. This has greatly accelerated 
the efforts towards disarmament. The change in military doctrine 
announced by the Warsaw Pact, characterized as being based on the 
"defensiveness" and "reasonable sufficiency" of the armed forces, has 
alleviated antagonisms and changed the customary ways of military 
thinking. This has led to a gradual change in perceptions of the "enemy" 
and to a partial collapse of threats. This development has had an 
important impact on how public opinion both in the East and the West 
now considers the development of armed forces and military 
expenditures. 
As the disarmament negotiations are still in progress, it is difficult to 
assess accurately their impact on European security. The political effect 
of the possible treaties and their impact on the threat perceptions of the 
alliances will be important. One can talk about a new European security 
system, in which it will be possible to scale down the significance of 
armaments and armed forces by multilateral measures. I-Iowever, on 
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the basis of the present situation in those negotiations that are of central 
importance to the Nordic region, i.e., the START negotiations in Geneva 
and the CFE negotiations in Vienna, one must conclude that the security-
political impact of these negotiations in the Nordic region is far from 
clear. 
There are signs indicating that the arms race will not slow down to a 
full stop but will be channeled into new areas. For example, the unequal 
counting rules for different types of strategic weapons contained in the 
emerging START treaty seem to put a premium on introducing more 
bombers and air-launched cruise missiles into the superpower nuclear 
arsenals. Naval forces and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, 
which have an impact on the military-political situation of Northern 
Europe, are not at the moment covered by the START negotiations. If 
the composition of the strategic nuclear triad were changed to favour 
air-breathing systems and sea-launched cruise missiles, it would increase 
the military significance of the air space of the northern region. 
The outcome of the CFE talks will have its primary effect on the military 
forces deployed in Central Europe. At this stage of the negotiations, 
when the regional questions are still to be solved, it is not possible to 
analyze their effects on Northern Europe with any degree of certainty. 
However, they may not be very significant. For example, the reduction 
of land-based armed forces will have a relatively small effect on the 
correlation of forces between the military alliances in the North. 
However, it is possible that when great numbers of armaments are 
withdrawn from Central Europe as the reductions take place there, 
some of the equipment may be transferred into storage areas located in 
Northern Europe, or it may be used to replace older equipment now in 
place in this region. The military alliances have abundant military 
potential available in Northern Europe, and more can be added in a 
short period of time, if necessary. This military potential is not going to 
decrease in real terms in the near future, although military postures 
may become more defensive as the doctrinal evolution continues. 
Neither of the treaties being negotiated is likely to set any qualitative 
limits to the development of weapons systems. The draft START treaty 
does not contain any restrictions on improving the technical quality of 
strategic weapons. In the CFE negotiations, no limitations on developing 
the capabilities of conventional armed forces have been proposed. Both 
the alliances have expressly stated that the combat readiness of the 
remaining armed forces will be raised, and that the mobility, firepower 
and training of the troops will be improved. 
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Furthermore, attention should be paid to the fact that military geography 
and climatic conditions in Northern Europe greatly differ from those 
in the Central European region which is the main focus of negotiations. 
Special equipment, lighter weapons systems, better transportation 
systems, amphibious troops, air transportation equipment, 
transportation helicopters and airborne troops — to mention only a few 
examples — will be of particular importance in the North. 
Thus the military changes taking place in Europe provide a basis for 
two different conclusions. Significant results are to be expected in 
disarmament negotiations in the next few years. As a consequence, the 
nuclear arsenals of both the Soviet Union and the United States as well 
as the conventional armed forces stationed in Europe will be 
considerably reduced from their present levels. In this regard, the 
outcome of the CFE negotiations will be of great significance for the 
security of Europe. 
However, along with the disarmament negotiations, arms buildups 
will continue in some fields. The focus of weapons development will 
be transferred from quantity to quality, and more effort will be directed 
to increasing the mobility of weapons systems, developing various 
types of precision-guided munitions that will greatly increase the 
lethality of firepower, and improving rapid intervention capabilities. 
In short, the objective will be to build a more efficient military force 
with the available national resources. 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF FINNISH 
DEFENCE POLICY 
Several positive features can be detected in the relations between the 
superpowers and in the political developments in Europe. With the 
lessening of confrontation, these features are also felt in the Nordic 
area. Nuclear weapons will retain their strategic importance, even 
though their credibility as a means of warfare is apparently declining. 
Military doctrines are becoming more defensive, although both the 
military alliances still underline the significance of counter-attack 
capability as part of defensive operations. 
The changes that have taken place in Europe have generally been 
positive. On the other hand, they have been so fast and profound that 
it is difficult to predict their future pace and direction. 
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The political effects of the treaties concluded, decisions on unilateral 
arms reductions and proposals that have been tabled in the on-going 
negotiations have been considerable. Still, it must be noted that 
disarmament negotiations have not yet been completed and most of 
their goals have not yet been achieved. The military buildup continues, 
and while the numbers of old weapons are decreasing, new and 
technically improved weapons systems are being deployed. The 
destructive power of weapons has not yet been reduced by any 
significant degree. 
From the Finnish point of view, the important factors include the 
increasing strategic significance of Northern Europe, and of the northern 
sea areas in particular, as well as the threat created by the deployment 
of cruise missiles. One should also note that relatively light weapons 
systems and other equipment designed for the special northern 
conditions are not yet on the agenda of any disarmament negotiations. 
Finland's security-political position is stable. By its own foreign policy, 
its policy of neutrality and its constructive efforts, for example within 
the framework of the CSCE process, Finland has been able to have a 
positive impact on its own security-political environment both in the 
Nordic region and more widely in Europe. The Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet 
Union has had and still has an important stabilizing effect on the 
Nordic situation. 
The objective of Finnish security policy is to prevent our country from 
being drawn into a possible conflict, and to prevent conflicts from 
spreading to our territory. From the military point of view, the crucial 
factor is that our neighbours and other countries can rely on Finland's 
capability to control and defend its territory. 
No country has questioned the validity of maintaining sufficient 
defensive capability, even in the changed European situation. It is still 
possible to use force or to threaten the use of armed force in relations 
between states, because considerable military potential will remain 
even after the various disarmament measures are carried out. In any 
case, international conflicts might arise to threaten security, and the 
possible use of military force below the threshold of war must also be 
taken into account. 
From the viewpoint of Finland, there are some permanent factors of 
military geography in Northern Europe that have an effect on our 
defence policy. Lapland and Southern Finland, as well as our national 
air space, are still strategically important areas for Finland. 
The northern areas, in particular the sea area and air space, are important 
for both the Soviet Union and NATO, and their importance may increase 
unless disarmament measures are extended to these regions. The Kola 
Peninsula is the strategically most important base area of the Soviet 
Union. Northern Norway is a significant region for NATO's surveillance 
and support systems. The northern parts of Finland are located between 
the alliances. This is important in crisis situations and for the defence 
of Finland's air space in particular. 
Southern Finland is the most vulnerable area of our country, since the 
majority of the population and industrial capacity, as well as the capital 
city are located there. Moreover, the important Soviet city of Leningrad 
and the capital city of Sweden, Stockholm, are located close to Southern 
Finland. The Baltic Sea will maintain its importance on the flank of the 
vital Central European area, since it is a channel of trade and an area of 
interest between the alliances and the two Nordic neutrals. It is possible 
that the significance of the Baltic Sea region will increase, as the security 
situation in Central Europe changes. 
Despite all the positive developments taking place in the field of 
disarmament, considerable quantities of both troops and armaments 
will remain in Europe. 
In order to guarantee the security of Finland and to defend the whole 
territory of the country, sufficient defensive capability must still be 
maintained. How strong a capability should be maintained, and how it 
should be developed, depends on the security-political environment of 
Finland. The changes now taking place in Europe will naturally have 
an effect on our assessments, but the final analysis must be made on 
the basis of lasting long-term trends. 
The Finnish defence capability must be of such a quality.that we will 
be able to adjust ourselves to rapidly changing situations, to keep 
various crisis situations under our control, and to prevent any military 
operations against our country or through the land or sea territory or 
air space of our country. 
The neutrality of Finland and Sweden, and the credible defence 
capability of these countries, have been widely seen as factors increasing 
the stability of the Nordic region. Finnish defence policy is based on 
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consistent long-term planning and on thorough analyses of the tasks 
and capability requirements of the Defence Forces. It is important that 
Finnish defence policy continues to be predictable, even in a changing 
international situation. 
DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND ON 
STIPULATIONS OF THE PARIS PEACE TREATY CONCERNING 
GERMANY AND LIMITING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF FINLAND, 21 
September 1990 
Background: 
In its decision of 21 september 1990 the Government has stated that the 
stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty signed in Paris in 1947 have 
lost their meaning, with the exception of the ban on nuclear weapons. 
The stipulations of the Peace Treaty concerning Germany are included 
in Part III of the Treaty. In accordance with them Finland has not been 
able to acquire or manufacture materiel or civilian aircraft of German 
origin or design. Finland has also been obliged to cooperate with a 
view to prevent the rearmament of Germany. 
The unification of Germany on 3 October 1990 creates a situation where 
the stipulations of the Peace Treaty concerning Germany lose their 
meaning. In the Peace Treaty (Article 10) Finland undertakes to 
recognize "the full force of ... other agreements or arrangements which 
have been or will be reached by the Allied and Associated Powers in 
respect with ... Germany ... for the restoration of peace". The German 
States and the victorious Powers of the Second World War have 
concluded the so-called 2+4 talks, which have resulted in freeing united 
Germany from all limitations of its sovereignty. Therefore it is not 
justified that the stipulations of the Paris Peace Treaty concerning 
Germany would continue to limit Finland's sovereignty. 
Part III of the Peace Treaty includes also other stipulations which limit 
Finland's sovereignty. Those are the quantitative and qualitative 
limitations concerning army, navy and air force. In practice, these 
limitations have largely lost their meaning already. The limitations 
concerning army, navy and air force have not formed a substantial 
impediment to the development of Finland's defence capability. Yet, 
the prohibition to acquire German materiel (Article 19) has hampered 
the development of the defence forces. An essentially liberal 
interpretation of the stipulations of Part III has been adopted. For 
example, it has been understood that the Peace Treaty does not prevent 
preparations for mobilization. 
The stipulations of Part III are, however, not in harmony with the 
status of Finland as an independent and sovereign State — a Member 
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State of the United Nations and participant in the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Finland was accepted as a Member of the 
UN in 1955. It is obvious from the history of the Peace Treaty and also 
from its text (Article 22) that the limitations were originally meant to 
be temporary, and membership in the world organization was to signify 
their termination. It was the cold war that caused the postponement of 
the termination of the limitations. 
A ban to acquire nuclear weapons is also included in the stipulations 
of Part III of the Peace Treaty. Naturally, it retains its significance. 
Finland has renewed this commitment by becoming Party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 1969 as one of the first States. 
As the Government states that the stipulations of Part III of the Peace 
Treaty have lost their meaning, the Peace Treaty as a whole is not 
touched upon. Finland has faithfully observed the stipulations of the 
Peace Treaty. The most important of them were the cession of territories, 
war reparations and the political and economic stipulations. All the 
other States, which signed a similar Peace Treaty, soon joined military 
alliances and, with the consent of their allies, did not observe the 
limitations of their Peace Treaties, although these stipulations were not 
officially repealed. 
The restrictions of the Peace Treaties are remnants from a time when, 
in the postwar situation, an attempt was made to prevent Germany 
and its former allies and co-belligerents from rearming themselves. 
The Peace Treaties, however, became a part of the cold war equilibrium. 
The fundamental change of the security situation in Europe makes it 
possible to recognize that the stipulations limiting sovereignty are 
outdated also with regard to Finland. 
The decision of the Government, stating the stipulations of Part III of 
the Peace Treaty have lost their meaning, does not alter the basis of 
Finland's security and defence policy. 
Britain and the Soviet Union have been informed of the decision of the 
Government. 
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Text of the Decision: 
After Germany has been united and its sovereignty reinstated, the 
Government of Finland considers the stipulations concerning Germany 
in Part III of the Paris Peace Treaty to have lost their meaning. 
The other stipulations in Part III of the Peace Treaty limiting Finland's 
sovereignty do not correspond to Finland's status as a Member State of 
the United Nations and Participating State in the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Therefore the Government states that also 
they have lost their meaning. 
The only exception is formed by atomic weapons, the acquisition of 
which is prohibited under Article 17 of the Peace Treaty. Finland has 
undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons also by becoming Party to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969. 
Stating that the stipulations in Part III of the Peace Treaty have lost 
their meaning does not alter the basis of Finland's security and defence 
policy. 
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Treaty of Peace with Finland. 
PART III. 
Military, Naval and Air Clauses. 
Article 13. 
The mainitemamce of -land, sea and air 
armaments and fortifications shall be 
closely restricted t.o meeting tasks of an 
internal character and local defence of 
frontiers. In accordance with the foregoing, 
Finland is authorized to have armed forces 
consisting of not more than: 
(a) A land army, including frontier 
troops and a.niti-aircraft artillery, with a 
total strength of 34,400 personnel 
(b) A navy with a personnel strength of 
4,500 and a total tonnage of 10,000 tons; 
(c) An air force, including any naval air 
arm, of GO aircraft, including reserves, with 
a total personnel strength of 3,000. Fin-
land shall not possess or acquire any air-
craft designed primarily as bombers with 
internal bomb-carrying facilities. 
These strengths shall in each case include 
combat, service and overhead personnel. 
Article 14. 
The personnel of the Finnish Army, 
Navy and Air Force in excess of the res-
pective strengths permitted under Article 
13, shall be disbanded within six months 
from the coming into force of the present 
Treaty. 
Article 15. 
Personnel not included in the Finnish 
Army, Navy or Air Force shall not receive 
any form of military trai~n7ng, naval 
training or military air training as defined 
in Annex II. 
Article 16. 
1. As from the coming into force of the 
present Treaty, Finland will he invited to 
join The Barents, Baltic, and Black Sea 
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Zone Board of the International Organi-
sation for Mine Clearance of European 
Waters, and shall maintain at the dis-
posal of the Central Mine Clearance Board 
all Finnish minesweeping forces until the 
end of the post-war mine clearance period, 
as determined by the Central Board, 
2. During this post-war mine clearance 
period, Finland may retain additional naval 
units employed only for the specific 
purpose of minesweeping, over and above 
the tonnage permitted in Article 13. 
Within two months of the end of the 
said period, such of these vessels as are 
on loan to the Finnish Navy from other 
Powers shall be returned to those Powers, 
and all other additional units shall be dis-
armed and converted to civilian use. 
3. Finland is also authorised to employ 
1,500 additional officers and men for 
minesweeping over and above the numbers 
permitted in Article 13. Two months after 
the completion of minesweeping by the 
Finnish Navy, the excesa personnel shall 
be disbanded or absorbed within the 
numbers permitted in the said Article. 
Article 17. 
Finland shall not possess, construct or 
experiment with any atomic 'weapon, any 
self-propelled or guided missiles or appa-
ratus connected with their discharge (other 
than torpedoes and torpedo-launching gear 
comprising the normal armament. of naval 
vessels permitted by the present. Treaty), 
sea-mines or torpedoes of non-contact types 
actuated by influence mechanisms, torpe-
does ca.p,able of being manned, submarines 
or other submersible craft, motor torpedo 
boats, or specialised types of assault craft. 
65 
Article 18. 
Finland shall not retain, produce or 
otherwise acquire, or maiiitain facilities for 
the manufacture of, war material in excess 
of that required for • the maintenance of 
the armed forces permitted under Article 
13 of the present Treaty 
Article 19. 
1. Exce.. ww•ar material of Allied origin 
shall be placed at the disposal of the Allied 
Power concerned according to the instrnc-
lions given hy tliat Power. i xca;5.s Finnish 
war material shall be placed at the disposal 
of the Governments of [lie Soviet Union 
and the United finndom. 1~'hu]and shall 
renounce all rights to this ismaterial. 
2. War inalerial of Genpann origin or 
design in excess of that required for the 
armed forces penni tied under the present 
Treaty shall be placed at the disposal of 
the 1'wo (Joveriiments. Finland shall not 
acquire or manufacture ally war niaterial 
of (Iterina~n origin of design, or employ or 
train any technicians, including military 
and civil aviation personnel, wlio are or 
have been nationals of Germany. 
3. Excess weir material mentioned in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall he 
handed over or destroyed within one year 
Ironi Iho coming inlo force of the present 
Treat v. 
4. A definition and list of Kvar material 
for the pur9o.sc.5 0l I lie l i esi,111 'l'i 	ii v are 
contained in 1liinex 111. 
.Article 20. 
Finland shall (u-ol e.ufc fully with iIlie 
Allied and Associnte3 I'ower:5 with a view 
to ensuring Ihtst Mcisotsoy )isar not be We 
to take steps outside lerman territory 
towards rcarinann cut. 
Article 21. 
Finland shall not acquire or mau.lifae-
ture civil aircraft which are of flerman or 
Japanese design or which embody major 
assemblies of (lerman or Japanese nianu-
facture or design. 
Article 22. 
Each of the nmilitary, naval and air 
clauses of the -present Treaty shall remain 
in force until niodified in whole or in part 
by agreement between the Allied and _1ss'--
ciated Powers and Finland or, af'tec Fin-
land IJeeoinci a. mein her of the United Na-
tions, hy agreement l)etiveeui the Scciuity 
Council and I'i,nland, 
Reparation and Restitution. 
Article 23. 
1. Losses caused to the Soviet Union Uv 
military operations and by the oecupation 
hy Fikancl of Soviet (ervitory ,shall be 
made good hy Pinland to the Soviet Union. 
lut, taking inlo eonsi(lei,ation that Finland 
lias not only withällawn from the war against 
the United Nations hitt lias also declared 
war on (.Icinuany and assisted iVith her 
forces in driving German troops out of 
I± inla,nd, the Partias agree that eompeii-
sation for the n,l)ovc losses will be made 
hy h'inland not in full, lint only in part, 
namely in flue n,inounit of $ 300,000,000 
li,Lpa'lrle over nigh I. 	Cal—, J'ront 5eptemhci~ 
19, 1944, in coirmo(litires (timber products, 
paper, cellulose, seagoing and river evart, 
suaidry inaeliinecry, and outer commodities) 
2. The basis of calculalion for the ett,le-
mc+ft provided iii this Article shall be the 
United Slates dollar at its gold parity on 
the day of the signing of the Armistice 
Agreement, i.e. 35 dollars for one ounce of 
gold. 
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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
CONCERNING THE FINNISH-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, 
CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, 21 September 1990 
Background: 
President Koivisto has recorded a statement in the protocol of the 
session of the Council of State on 21 September 1990 concerning the 
reference to Germany in the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948 on Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). Its background is the 
following: 
The unification of Germany takes place on 3 October 1990. The external 
aspects of the unification were agreed upon in a Treaty concluded by 
the two German states and the four victorious powers in Moscow on 
12 September 1990. This Treaty signifies a final settlement of the Second 
World War and the restoration of full sovereignty for Germany. It 
resolves the central problem of East-West confrontation. 
The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of 
Germany initialled on 12 September 1990 a bilateral Treaty on good 
neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation. This Treaty is expected 
to be signed during President Gorbachev's visit to Germany later this 
autumn. 
The reference to Germany as a possible aggressor, contained in the first 
Article of the 1948 Treaty, has for long been considered to reflect the 
situation existing at the time it was signed. The changed circumstances 
have rendered it obsolete. 
In Finland, the standard interpretation of the Treaty has focused on 
Finland's duty as a sovereign State to repel any attack rather than on 
the question of a possible aggressor. 
The Finnish-Soviet declaration of 26 October 1989 sets as a goal the 
dismantling of the "threat perceptions of the past". 
The reference to Germany in the Treaties between the Soviet Union 
and its allies (with the exception of Poland) was removed in the 1960's 
and 1970's. 
M 
When the Finnish Government stated on 21 September 1990 that the 
provisions concerning Germany in the Paris Peace Treaty have lost 
their meaning, the question may arise concerning the reference to 
Germany in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance. It is therefore necessary that the above interpretation is 
recorded. 
The intention of the Finnish Government is not to open a discussion 
about modifying the FCMA Treaty. The Treaty functions well also 
under changing circumstances. 
Text of the Statement: 
The reference to Germany as a possible aggressor contained in the 1948 
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) 
between Finland and the Soviet Union reflects a historical appraisal of 
the situation prevailing at the time of its signing. Such a situation no 
longer exists. Recent developments, in particular the relaxation of 
confrontation in Europe, the unification of Germany and the 
international agreements relating to it signify that the said reference in 
the FCMA Treaty has become obsolete. 
In stating the above, the Finnish Government reaffirms that in the 
changing circumstances the essential purpose of the FCMA Treaty 
remains unchanged, i.e. Finland will not allow her territory to be used 
for an attack against the Soviet Union. The Treaty continues to serve 
Finnish security interests. 
(Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Release Nr. 278, 
21 September 1990) 
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